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Abstract:
The term “security” has many more dimensions in the post-9/11 world than it had during 
the Cold War.  Threats may come from different sources, at different speeds, and have 
different targets.  All the actors involved in the provision of security from a specific type 
of threat create a network—not just states or states in intergovernmental organizations, 
but all the actors in the “ecosystem." If we look at the relationships among these actors 
using network analysis, we should be able to map the structure of the entire network. 
Contrary to the assumptions in most International Relations literature, networks can be 
centralized (as in hierarchical states) or not, as in markets.  The networks transnational 
actors have created to meet different threats exhibit different structures, from dense and 
highly centralized to diffuse and dispersed.  The network’s structure may thus have a 
positive or negative effect on the provision of security, depending on the type of threat 
that is to be met.
The Jeweled Net of Indra
Driving down the freeway, remembering Hindu mythology—
Indra’s net, each intersecting weave holding a jewel
reflecting every other facet of every other jewel, infinitely.
Suddenly, I see the hands that paint the white lines,
that lay the black asphalt, hands of a man joyous or lost
soap-scrubbing his body clean for dinner and beer,
for the wife who loves him, hands that hold their tickets
for London to see the grandmother, the hard-drinking
pub matron whose body bore children in building rubble
when the Nazi bombing relented—and if not for that war,
would I be driving now, hands on the wheel, listening
to the radio recount the birth of the child named Tsunami
after the storm that drove her mother into the hills,
would the meager dollars I send to rebuild a village—
minted with the Rosicrucian-eye above the pyramid
dreamed by this country’s founders as the all-seeing
vision of a world where not a sparrow falls
that we don’t know about—would I have known
to send it, if not for the hands that flew the kite
that drew electricity from the skies that made its way
into the flat-screened box that unveils this jewel-linked world
twenty-four hours of every gleaming day, weaving news
with advertisements for clothes made by hands in China
nimbly sewing a dream of Hollywood and Ipod and offering
their bodies one by one for a better future—
while the coal that fumes the electricity that plunges
the needle drifts in air that circles a globe that warms
the icecaps that melt into sea that shifts the current
that loves the wind that swirls from heaven to earth
stirring one storm after another, blowing
its diaphanous passion over New Orleans like a trumpet
sinking the heart so low with blue notes that flood
is a dark cure for what burns—this illusion
that anyone stands alone—stranded
on the roofs of our swollen houses mouthing
save me to a world whose millions of hands
can turn up the volume loud enough to finally hear,
or flick with a single click the entire interconnected
vision of it all off.
—Dane Cervine (2007)
What do a slice of Swiss cheese, a Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI) scan, and 
global governance have in common?  The familiar cheese is a structure whose taste 
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remains unchanged but whose visual appearance changes by slicing in different 
directions—depending on the cut, the same holes appear different. An MRI takes finely 
detailed pictures of such heterogeneous structures as the human brain. Tiny two-
dimensional slices are assembled to provide an extremely accurate three-dimensional 
depiction of complex reality, but any one slice provides only a partial picture that is 
accurate but can be misleading. The concept of global governance provides a description 
of the complex, heterogeneous structures of the connections and interactions in world 
politics, which can be studied by examining slices at different geographical, temporal, 
and issue junctures. At present, social scientists have knives to slice cheese but are 
grasping for tools to take MRI slides.
In ameliorating global governance theorizing, this paper examines first definitions 
of global governance and then the use of social network analysis to map the transactions 
between multiple actors—the most promising way to appreciate the partial and currently 
available slices of contemporary international relations. It continues with empirical 
examples of global security governance: international responses to the Indian Ocean 
tsunami of December 2004 and nuclear proliferation. It ends with a description of 
network strategies for governance and suggestions for a future research agenda.
Global Governance
Definitions
Global governance is too new a notion to be defined in many political science 
lexicons, or even in the Oxford English Dictionary’s online edition. However, in its 
inaugural edition in 1995, the journal Global Governance contained definitional attempts 
by James N. Rosenau and Lawrence S. Finkelstein.
Rosenau, building on his life’s work, writes that governance is concerned with the 
mechanisms of control (both trans-national and sub-national practices and institutions) 
that are essentially related to one another, and when taken together constitute systems of 
rule. He emphasizes the exponential growth of interdependence as actors proliferate to 
meet the new needs that are created. The existing world order remains without 
overarching authority, which does not mean that there is no structure: “Governance 
encompasses the activities of governments, but it also includes the many other channels 
through which ‘commands’ flow in the form of goals framed, directives issued, and 
policies pursued” (Rosenau 1995:14). There is no global ordering principle, but global 
governance is usefully seen as the sum of the formal and informal mechanisms that 
ensure partial ordering—what Rosenau poetically calls a “crazy quilt.”
Finkelstein wrote that “global” denotes a world in which actors other than states 
play an increasingly important role, and in which decision-making processes are 
multilevel, connected both within and between states. “Governance” is an ambiguous 
term that refers to governing without government, the title of Rosenau and Ernst 
Czempiel’s earlier set of influential essays (Rosenau and Czempiel 1992). “Global 
governance,” for Finkelstein, is “any purposeful activity intended to ‘control’ or 
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influence someone else that either occurs in the arena occupied by nations or, occurring 
at other levels, projects influence into that arena.”  It is a process of activity, and to 
differentiate it from other terms, its descriptive rather than normative nature should be 
emphasized: “global governance is governing, without sovereign authority, relationships 
that transcend national frontiers” (Finkelstein 1995:368-9).  
More recently, Anne Mette Kjaer examined the term “governance” and its usage 
in different fields of political science including comparative politics, international 
relations, and public administration policy.  She found that most definitions refer to 
something broader than government alone: to the “steering” and rules of the game as well 
as to institutions and institutional change.  Increasing use of the same term among fields, 
in her opinion, reflects the erosion of boundaries.  All versions address the importance of 
networks, of reciprocity, accountability, and democracy.  
However, different fields are addressing different problems, and the views of 
global governance held in international relations vary strongly depending on whether or 
not contemporary globalization is seen as a transformation of economic, military, 
environmental, and socio-cultural interactions.  Theorists tend to fall in two camps: those 
who believe states are the most important actors, and those who do not.  Neo-realists and 
pluralists (of the English school) believe that global governance is no more than what 
states agree, while solidarists look to the collective action of states in defense of human 
security as global governance.  However, solidarists differ from neo-realists and pluralists 
in believing that globalization has been transformative.  Finally, liberalists believe that 
not only are many global governance processes underway at subnational, national, and 
supranational levels, but that the regimes thus created are likely to be flat non-
hierarchical networks with no one actor in clear control.  Thus, for them, global 
governance refers to the totality of all regimes (Kjaer 2004). 
“Global governance” does not denote good or bad practice but describes 
cooperative problem-solving arrangements. They may be formal, taking the shape of laws 
or institutions to manage collective affairs by such actors as state authorities, IGOs, 
NGOs, private sector firms, other civil society actors, and individuals. But arrangements 
may also involve such informal mechanisms as practices or guidelines or even temporary 
units (e.g., coalitions). Global governance includes purpose-built regimes as well as 
market-driven evolutions and adaptations.
This author agrees with Thakur and Weiss that global governance is “the complex 
of formal and informal institutions, mechanisms, relationships, and processes between 
and among states, markets, citizens and organizations, both inter- and non-governmental, 
through which collective interests on the global plane are articulated, rights and 
obligations are established, and differences are mediated” (Thakur and Weiss 2010). 
This definition emphasizes five components that are essential for analyzing contemporary 
international relations: level of analysis (transnational); issues; non-state actors; the 
dynamics of governance; and the interdependent yet loosely-coupled complex 
international system.
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Structure and agency
Global governance is about understanding and creating structures through 
repeated relationships, or patterns of authority. It is a heuristic device that allows us to 
pay attention to a range of activities and actors in contemporary world politics. States 
remain the most important actors, but a host of other actors are increasingly crucial; and 
all of the actors in any case are interdependent. And interests are partly a result of an 
actor’s attributes and identity, and partly of its structural role and position within the 
extant world order.
Collectivities are organized to achieve goals, and they draw on different sources 
of legitimacy. For example, a state is organized differently from a corporation, and for 
different purposes. A state has sovereignty, which provides an interest in defending a 
given territory. A corporation is organized to make a profit, which gives it an interest in 
certain people (its market). Global governance thus recognizes that human beings create 
many kinds of organizational structures that interact with one other and evolve 
constantly.
This is structure as the Gramscian idea of historic bloc: the superstructures 
formed by the unification of leaders and followers around a particular mode of 
production, and the social relations it engenders (Joll 1977, Sassoon 1987, Gramsci and 
Forgacs 1988).  In international relations, the “product” may be a process such as war, or 
it may be a service like humanitarian aid.  Hegemony, then, is the point where the ideas 
that govern that product meets the class of actors that both supports the ideas and is 
supported by them.
In other words, the structural position of actors depends on the framing of an 
issue, or how it is categorized by actors that are paying attention to it.  A state active in 
peace and security may not be as engaged on environmental issues, or the other way 
around—for example, Israel is active in security issues, but is not known for its stand on 
the environment, while Japan’s involvement in security is not as well known as its 
activity in environmental issues. Or an NGO can have tremendous impact on rule-making 
but not on enforcement or the other way around—for instance, the International 
Campaign to Ban Landmines’s lobbying led to a multilateral treaty, while Amnesty 
International’s reporting and shaming have been effective at protecting human rights. 
This framing of global governance allows us to pursue a constructivist research 
agenda that fits Jeffrey T. Checkel’s criteria for building “middle-range theory,” or 
efforts to link theory to reality. In essence, it consists of making one’s ontology consistent 
with one’s epistemology, and vice versa.  Checkel seeks a constructivist theory that can 
test reality in comparison and in contradiction to theory; compare among cases; be used 
to study socially constructed outcomes that are negative and not just positive; and 
formulate standardized definitions (Checkel 1998).
Other schools of thought
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Realists study state vs. state behavior.  Liberal institutionalists scrutinize state 
interactions with international institutions. Rather than placing constructivism in 
opposition to either, it is best viewed at the other end of a spectrum.  The lessons from 
realism and liberal institutionalism are pertinent to explain actor behavior, but they are 
misleading or insufficient to understand the ever-changing behavior of the international 
system as a whole, and unexpected outcomes. That requires the sum of all such 
relationships.
Returning to Checkel’s criteria, we need to look at multiple slices of global 
governance, investigating simultaneously as many different types of ties between and 
among actors as possible.  We also need to examine the ties (or lack thereof) between 
different types of actors, and to study entire networks.  To that end, I propose to look at 
how actors do or do not interact in global governance.
Not all MRI-like slices provide the same picture of the evolution in international 
society because the patterns of relationships and institutions vary by issue, geographic 
location, and historical period. For instance, calculations about international peace and 
security are not the same for major and minor powers, not similar for nuclear weapons 
and drugs, and not comparable before and after 9/11.
Global governance is often conducted by different types of actors, depending on 
an issue—for instance for international security, members of the US’s 82nd Airborne 
Division (national armed forces) or UN peacekeepers (international armed forces). At the 
same time, actors that are a priori viewed as distinct may actually play similar roles—for 
example, soldiers or Oxfam personnel in a war zone may both be caring for or protecting 
refugees. 
Using Social Network Analysis to Study Global Governance
An ecological approach looks at the entire system of interactions, both among 
actors and between actors and environment.  Global governance fits the definition of a 
complex system: multiple types of actors and processes, the structure of which is the 
result of past structure, actor choices, and stochastic processes.  The modelling of such 
complex systems in international relations has its roots in sociology and English School 
international relations theory. It is greatly facilitated by the use of quantitative social 
network analysis methods, used to map broad trends and patterns, which can then be used 
as a basis for comparison, for finding “communities” of similar actors, and for 
investigations into dynamics.  To demonstrate this, examples from a range of global 
security governance issues will be explored.
However, using social network analysis to study global governance requires 
careful examination of both ontology and epistemology, as the definitions and 
conceptions of what is to be studied are affected by the choice of a formal mathematical 
approach.  In contrast to both realism and liberal institutionalism, which look at the 
pattern of interaction among the members of only one or two types of organization, the 
ecological approach assumes that all the organizations that demonstrate agency, or 
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choice, count as actors.  These actors interact with each other and with their environment, 
which refers not just to the strictly material or ideal, but also to background trends such 
as globalization that do not exhibit agency.  In this sense, it draws upon the heritage of 
English School theory (Bull 1977, Buzan 2004, Devlen et al. 2005, Hurrell 2007).  This 
approach also means that the intellectual puzzles of researchers will change, as the 
questions become more oriented toward patterns of cooperation and cohesion, and less 
about the actions and motivations of individual actors, or of specific types of actors.  
Slices of political space
A graphic representation of political space would show the multiple dimensions in 
which issues can be mapped.  The dimensions to be mapped may vary, but as an 
example, security could be mapped by asking these questions: “Where does the threat 
come from?” “What is the target of the threat?” “How fast does the threat move?” and 
“What is the severity of the threat?”  These are spectra, or continuums, not dichotomous 
categories, and thus can be imagined as dimensional axes.  Patterns of cooperation, or 
networks among actors, are different depending on where one looks on these dimensions.
An advantage of mapping along multiple dimensions is that no one position can 
be seen as a priori privileged.  It also means that the space can be “questioned” by 
different lines of thought.  For example, one could ask where the organizations that deal 
with the security of internally displaced persons (IDP) camps intersect with organizations 
that deal with human rights or more specifically women’s rights.  This would help 
provide security to those most likely to face unique threats to their security while in the 
camps, not just the threat that the camp itself provides security from.
Take slices of this space by imagining Swiss cheese or an MRI: one slice may be 
a very misleading picture of the structure, but build up enough layers, and you start to get 
a 3-D object.  If the networks are the slices, more than one slice can be studied.  Some of 
these networks may have overlapping memberships, or intersections.  
Fig. 1: Slices of security space
Capturing the complexity of the range of problems, actors, and partial solutions is a 
benefit of using global governance as an analytical perspective in understanding 
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international responses to events like the tsunami. But we are still at the Swiss cheese-
level of precision, groping for tools for a few MRI-level slides. What could get us closer? 
Social network analysis (SNA) is one promising methodology because it allows 
comparisons of the types of contours of structures and gaps that characterize international 
reactions to global problems. It provides a way to systematically study the structural 
properties of networks as well as the location and characteristics of actors within them; it 
uses mathematical representation in order to quantify empirical data and to model 
relations and structures and represent the results graphically.  SNA allows the 
simultaneous consideration of multiple relationships—a major insight for the analysis of 
international relations, even when considering states let alone the multiple types of actors 
and layers of relationships that characterize contemporary global governance.  The 
following section is meant as a basic introduction to the elements of SNA using 
comparative security networks for those who are totally unfamiliar with SNA.  For a 
more thorough introduction, please see the article “Social network analysis: A 
methodological introduction,” by Carter Butts (2008), or the texts by Scott (1991), 
Wasserman and Faust (1994), or Knoke and Yang (2008).
The basic elements of SNA are actors, which are the social units, and relations, 
which are the ties between or among actors that are channels for the flow of resources 
(ties can be affiliations, as in members of the same club).  There are three basic 
assumptions underlying social network analysis. First, we are dealing with relationships 
or connections and not merely static units.  It is therefore not a method suited to studying 
units in isolation.  Second, SNA assumes that social units are interdependent; their ties 
both enable and constrain actions.  This also means that regular statistical methods have 
limited utility because actors are not independent and cannot be analyzed in isolation one 
from another.  Third, SNA assumes that there are system-wide relational properties, and 
that the sum of such “enduring patterns of relations” constitutes the system’s structure.
Network terms can be translated into international relations via the measures of 
power in global governance described by Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall.  They 
divide types of power into a matrix with two core dimensions: the kinds of social 
relations through which power works, and the specificity of the social relations through 
which power’s effects are produced (Barnett and Duvall 2005).  The first kind of power, 
familiar to realists, is compulsory power that represents direct control of one actor over 
another.  This can be measured in network terms in many ways: as a regulatory 
relationship with one party making and enforcing rules, as a contractual relationship with 
an exchange of goods or services for payment, or a conflictual relationship with one party 
using violence against another.  
Institutional power is more diffuse because actors exert control over others that 
are socially distant.  Membership in an alliance, attendance at UN conferences and other 
types of affiliations are network relations that measure this type of power.  Structural 
power represents the capacities of actors—in other words, what they are depends on 
where they are in the network.  Finally, productive power is the production of subjects 
through the diffuse social relations of discursive practices.  To paraphrase, an actor’s 
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“self” is a creation of discourse, or negotiation with and against multiple others.  This can 
be measured longitudinally by process tracing that links diffusion of norms and ideas to 
actor constitution—that is, it is helpful to track the progress of an idea through the 
network, and then look for evidence that the actors’ identities have changed as a result.  
This paper explores network "slices" of the cloud of actors involved in the 
governance of global security issues (for the purposes of demonstration, this paper looks 
at networks from different issue areas, but the concept applies to geographical and 
temporal slices as well).  The networks I will be examining are two networks from a case 
study of a human security threat—the Indian Ocean tsunami, and two networks from a 
case study of a traditional security threat—the attempt to stem nuclear proliferation. This 
paper then maps the institutional and compulsory power relations in both human security 
(the tsunami) and traditional security (nuclear nonproliferation) networks.
The actors belong to different sets (because they are different types of 
organizations—states, NGOs, companies, etc.), but there are also connections among and 
between sets.  On the basis of this theoretical framework, it should be possible to 
examine both clustering, or how closely connected actors are, and structural equivalence, 
or finding “communities” of actors with similar patterns of relations to the rest of the 
network. 
Slices of Global Governance: Traditional and Human Security Networks
Human security and traditional security are different but related hegemonic ideas 
that engender different but related historic blocs.  International peace and security—
whether the more expansive human security variety of protection against threats to 
individuals, or the more traditional “bombs and bullets” one of protection for national 
boundaries—has been viewed as the exclusive preserve of states (MacFarlane and Foong-
Khong 2006). Protecting public health normally also is viewed as a state responsibility, 
and measures taken against the spread of disease have been among the most draconian 
(Kraut 1994). The state has also been responsible for infrastructure and its failure—which 
is why the Netherlands invested billions to hold back the North Sea and why the breach 
of levees in New Orleans was viewed as a government failure. 
Dangers resulting from public health and infrastructure failure thus are viewed as 
threats to human security as well as to traditional sovereignty. The Indian Ocean tsunami 
of 26 December 2004 demonstrates global action to meet a security threat that 
transcended national borders. Analyzing it illustrates better the strengths and weaknesses 
of global governance—in theory and in practice—than pointing to the obvious lack of 
adequate political will or international military force to intervene in Darfur (Center for 
International Cooperation 2007). 
The response to the Indian Ocean tsunami provides a microcosm of global 
governance and how a global problem is addressed in a decentralized world.  The 
responses by a constellation of relief organizations, national governments, militaries, and 
private individuals around the world illustrate the strengths and weaknesses of global 
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governance. An overall response network (states, IGOs, and NGOs) was in place, but the 
creation of the tailored network for the tsunami required negotiating a structure among 
existing groups as well as procedures to incorporate others that joined later. 
The provision of emergency supplies to affected populations was available almost 
immediately, reflecting a long-standing moral commitment to react quickly and 
generously in the face of natural disasters. As people in the affected regions began 
calling, texting, and uploading images and movies, massive relief began. In a natural 
disaster, the acceptance of outside humanitarian action was virtually automatic, which is 
not the case in wars because aid can be seen to be benefiting the enemy rather than the 
common good. Humanitarianism can be traced from the major world religions through 
Cicero, medieval philosopher St. Thomas Aquinas, father of international law Hugo 
Grotius, and liberal peace philosopher Immanuel Kant. As a codified modern 
international institutionalized response, humanitarianism can be traced back to the Battle 
of Solferino (1859), when Henri Dunant’s actions led to the formation of the International 
Committee of the Red Cross, to his lobbying for Napoleon III to proclaim the rights of 
the wounded, and to the 1864 Geneva Convention. Norm evolution since then has both 
sought to constrain state actions and enable international succor for natural and many 
human-made disasters (Weiss and Collins 2000). In the case of the tsunami, we have seen 
that “competitive compassion” resulted in what many even saw as excess resources for 
the tsunami victims. 
In a human security frame, the network is more likely to be self-organized, 
meaning the number of actors, as well as the type of actor involved could be increased, 
allowing for an openness and transparency that could be met by communication among 
the actors. In contrast, the organization of the actors in the networks that prevent nuclear 
proliferation is for the most part, not self-organized, which has implications for its 
effectiveness. This in turn allows accountability: progress, or lack thereof, could be 
openly tracked through the media as in the case of the Indian Ocean tsunami (Telford and 
Cosgrave 2006), or through nongovernmental organizations such as the World Nuclear 
Association. A network that is more formally organized, by treaties and executive 
agreements, may be more stable and permanent, but it is likely to be less open, and more 
rigid in responding to new attempts at proliferation.  
States in the nonproliferation network, by attempting to hold onto their de jure 
authority, may be denying the network as a whole the flexibility and transparency it 
needs to counter proliferation: “The relationships between the DPRK [North Korean] and 
Khan networks show the shifting roles that ring members may play, with the DPRK 
acting on different occasions as a buyer, seller, and supplier to mutual partners” (Braun 
and Chyba 2004). Stopping or at least controlling proliferation is important; as Sagan 
explained, more nuclear states will be worse for the world. Novice nuclear states lack 
either adequate military or civilian political organizational controls, and therefore have a 
higher risk of either deliberate or accidental nuclear war. Deterrence strategy took the 
U.S. and U.S.S.R. years to work out; many new nuclear states seem completely unaware 
of the depth of thinking necessary. Furthermore, deterrence may not work, because 
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novice nuclear states’ capability may not survive to make a second-strike (Sagan and 
Waltz 1995).
Network Measurements
All calculations were performed with Ucinet 6 and all images were created using 
Netdraw (Borgatti, et al. 2002), unless otherwise noted.  The compulsory power network 
for the tsunami consisted of 2,107 records of financial transactions among 505 distinct 
actors from the Financial Tracking Service database.  These actors were states, IGOs, 
NGOs, companies, academic institutions, municipalities, news media organizations, and 
private individuals, with a reserve category of “unspecified” for those that could not be 
traced via web search (Kamran 2009a).  This network will be referred to as the 
“transnational aid flows” network.  The institutional power network for the tsunami 
consisted of 2,504 records of cooperative interactions among 234 distinct actors culled 
from OCHA’s situation reports, in the following categories: state, IGO, NGO, academic 
institution, company, state-owned company, multiple (indicating an organization with 
multiple types of actors acting as one), and private individual (Kamran 2009a).  This 
network will be referred to as the “OCHA sitreps” network.
The compulsory power network for nuclear nonproliferation consisted of 575 
records of financial transactions among 454 distinct actors created from the Business 
Source Premier (now called Business Source Complete) database maintained by EBSCO. 
These actors were states, companies, state-owned corporations, joint action agencies 
(joint-action agencies are owned by their members, which are electricity cooperatives), 
partnerships, joint ventures, academic institutions, nongovernmental organizations 
(NGOs), intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), and unknown.  Actors were coded as 
state-owned if they were more than 50% owned by a state (Kamran 2009b).  This 
network will be referred to as the “nuclear contracts” network.  The institutional power 
network for nuclear nonproliferation consisted of 196 distinct actors related by twelve 
treaties or agreements.  These actors were all states as recognized by the United Nations, 
with the exception of Taiwan, Republic of China (Kamran 2009b).  This network will be 
referred to as the “nuclear treaties” network.  For more information on all these networks, 
please refer to the sources.
The most commonly used measures to examine social networks are density, 
centrality, cohesion, and durability.  Density in a network is a measure indicating the total 
of all existing ties divided by the number of ties possible in the network (with the value 
of the ties being included in ordinal networks). Within and between block densities can 
be calculated for data that are grouped.  For example, data can be partitioned into 
different types of organizations and examined for the density of information exchange 
within and between types—a key measure of diffusion of ideas. 
Box 1: Density
Frame Relation Network Density
Human Security Compulsory power transnational aid flows 0.9
Institutional power OCHA sitreps 1.0
Traditional Security Compulsory power nuclear contracts 1.1
11
Institutional power nuclear treaties 2.4
As is clear from Box 1, density is higher in traditional security networks than in 
human security networks.  This is likely a reflection of flexibility and ease of 
making/breaking ties in human security networks.  However, it also indicates that the 
speed at which information diffuses among the actors is relatively quicker in the 
traditional security networks, and the extent to which actors in those networks have levels 
of social constraint is higher than in human security networks.  Density is also higher in 
the compulsory power relations than in the institutional power relations of both human 
and traditional security networks, demonstrating that making ties in order to share 
information and expertise (as well as enforcement) generally involves more than bilateral 
ties—information diffusion is maximized when there are more actors in the network.
Centrality is a key indication of power, because it measures how information and 
resources flow or fail to.  “Closeness centrality” indicates the shortest paths to all other 
actors, while “degree centrality” the number of direct connections an actor has. The best 
way to understand these measurements are in-degrees and out-degrees, indicating actors 
by the number of choices that they could make and the number of ties established by 
them.
Box 2: Centrality
Frame Relation Network Closeness Centrality Degree Centrality
Human 
Security
Compulsory 
power
transnational aid 
flows
(this measure is not 
applicable in a 
disconnected graph)
• Private 
(individual 
donations) 
• United States 
• United Kingdom 
• EC 
Humanitarian 
Aid Office
• IFRC 
• International 
Organization for 
Migration
• UN OCHA
• World Health 
Organization 
Institutional 
power
OCHA sitreps • UN
• Indonesia
• Sri Lanka
• Thailand
• US
• UN
• Indonesia
• Sri Lanka
• Thailand
• US
Traditional 
Security
Compulsory 
power
nuclear 
contracts
• Areva
• Framatome ANP
• Exelon Corp
• Westinghouse 
Electric Co
• US Department of 
Energy
• Westinghouse 
Electric Co
• Chernobyl 
Shelter Project
• US Department 
of Energy
• Framatome ANP
• Areva
12
Institutional 
power
nuclear treaties • Australia
• New Zealand
• Argentina
• Austria
• Belgium
• Australia
• New Zealand
• Argentina
• Austria
• Belgium
Box 2 shows the actors in each network with the highest centrality scores.  Degree 
centrality for “transnational aid flows” is divided into outdegree (on top) for aid donors 
and indegree (on bottom) for aid recipients.  There can be important differences in which 
actors are most central according to the measure used, which is why it is recommended to 
look at more than one measure.  One thing that becomes clear, however, is that nonstate 
actors can be as or more important to the structure and functioning of the network than 
state actors. 
Cohesion measures sub-structures within networks, such as alliances or even 
cliques.  Cohesive subgroups have four general properties: mutuality of ties, closeness or 
“reachability” of subgroup members, frequency of ties among members, and the relative 
frequency of ties among subgroup members compared to non-members (Wasserman and 
Faust 1994).  The institutional power relation networks were more cohesive than the 
compulsory power networks, even though in the human security frame the organizations 
did not necessarily have ties prior to the event while in the traditional security frame the 
cohesion was the result of long and painstaking multilateral treaty negotiation-.  This 
result has implications for effectiveness at responding to a security event: networks that 
are not cohesive are less likely to communicate well, and should therefore be more likely 
to duplicate efforts and waste resources.  
There are many measures that look at the similarity of roles in a network. 
Structural equivalence indicates that different actors share a jointly occupied position in 
the network.  For example, if actor A and actor B both have ties to actor C, they share a 
position.  The pattern of ties to other actors is emphasized here; it is the similarity of ties 
that creates the shared position, not that the actors share the same ties (White et al. 1976). 
Actor A could have a tie to an actor that is similar to actor C, and that would still be 
regarded as structurally equivalent.  In the transnational aid flows network, there was an 
interesting breakdown of actors into large clusters of aggregators and channels. 
Aggregators collected aid from individuals and from other organizations and passed it on 
to channels, which delivered the aid, either themselves or through others in the region.  In 
the OCHA sitreps network, the cutpoints, or the actors that were major hubs for 
information, were the UN, the World Health Organization (WHO), Maldives, Thailand, 
Sri Lanka, and Indonesia.  The equivalence classes in the nuclear treaty network points 
out the danger that many nuclear weapons states are in separate classs.  Also, there are 
states in these classes that have indigenous nuclear capabilities, either for research, power 
generation, or both. Another way to discover structural equivalence is through 
hierarchical clustering.  For the nuclear contracts network, these hierarchical clusters 
show that being different organization types does not hamper certain types of similarity. 
For example, Areva is a vertically-integrated organization with contracts from suppliers 
and to customers at every stage of the fuel cycle from mining to plant operation.  The 
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other actors in Areva’s “class” have similar patterns of ties, whether they are state-owned 
corporations like Areva or not.
A drawback to social network analysis is that it relies ultimately on quantification 
and is a crude measure for dealing with unquantifiable nuance or the rich contextual 
detail of more qualitative studies. However, SNA is suitable for getting “the big picture,” 
or persistent patterns of behavior within the contemporary world order.  Furthermore, 
using the language and methods of social network analysis allows researchers to enter 
into a genuine dialogue with other disciplines that deal with networks of interactions such 
as mathematics, physics, and biology.  For example, it may be possible to re-create 
missing data about relationships in a network through Bayesian analysis.  Recent research 
in biology used Bayesian network analysis to predict the number and location of links in 
a cellular network, which was then tested against what is known about that network from 
independent research.  The study found that their network analysis was highly successful 
in predicting links from limited amounts of information (Sachs et al. 2005).
Intersectionality
The concept of intersectionality first surfaced in critical theory, and was best 
explained by Kimberle Crenshaw in a study on the effects of different types of violence 
on women of color.  She found that the narratives that describe, explain, and circumscribe 
race and gender are coded—“blacks” are male in the mainstream narratives, while 
“females” are white.  Intersectionality refers to the properties exhibited by actors that 
belong to racial and gender identity groups that are narratively treated as being mutually 
exclusive.  This could have disastrous effects on policy choices, preventing women of 
color for reporting violence, for preventing violence, and from accessing services for 
domestic violence victims.  “Although racism and sexism readily intersect in the lives of 
real people, they seldom do in feminist and antiracist practices.  And so, when the 
practices expound identity as woman or person of color as an either/or proposition, they 
relegate the identity of women of color to a location that resists telling” (Crenshaw 1991). 
In other words, actors belonging to multiple networks (as measured by their different 
relationships) can be expected to have different identities, to face different structural 
opportunities and constraints, and to pursue different interests.  
Feminists have recognized a “need for understanding complexities posed by 
intersections of different axis of differentiation.” Intersectionality thus signifies “the 
complex, irreducible, varied, and variable effects which ensue when multiple axis of 
differentiation – economic, political, cultural, psychic, subjective and experiential – 
intersect in historically specific contexts.  The concept emphasizes that different 
dimensions of social life cannot be separated out into discrete and pure strands”(Brah and 
Phoenix 2004).  Actors at intersections do not experience identity as additive—black + 
female = black female—they experience identity in unique ways, often in opposition to 
the mainstream narrative.
Intersectionality is therefore a complex and fluid concept, difficult to 
operationalize, and even more difficult to quantify—unless we marry network analysis to 
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mathematics: membership in a network is a dimension of identity (whether for individual 
or collective actors), and again, the networks themselves can be considered cells or 
subsets of a set or hypergraph.  Thus, the intersection of two sets A and B is the set that 
contains all elements of A that also belong to B (or equivalently, all elements of B that 
also belong to A), but no other elements.  
To find the intersection of the four networks discussed here, the software program 
ORA (Carley 2010) yielded some interesting results: Australia, Austria, Belgium, 
Canada, India, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United 
States were the members of this class appearing in all four networks.  All are states; there 
are no nonstate actors in the group.  While realists might point out that this would be their 
expected result anyway, it is an important result because the intersection does not depend 
on a priori definitions of actors but on the relations in which these actors are active.  As a 
result, it could change in the future—indeed, one could argue that within the United 
Nations family there are treaty-based non-proliferation organizations, so the United 
Nations should also be included in the intersection and that it was not is a mere artefact of 
coding.  
Furthermore, the focus on multiple relations or layers means that the actors in the 
intersection are not just features in the network surface topography, but are prominent in 
the networks’ geology.  It comes as no surprise that the highly developed states of 
Western Europe, North America, Australia, and Japan are active in the provision of 
security in many frames and relations.  However, the intersection also indicates that there 
are newcomers to this club such as India.  There are also notable no-shows, such as 
China, Brazil, and Russia.
There are several possible uses for intersections.  This would be useful for 
“profiling,” or to ask a specific question of multiple networks (i.e., how many actors fit a 
specific profile).  It could be used to find a core of actors in multiple networks.  This 
would be useful in global economic governance in taking the economy’s “temperature” in 
testing the network positions of companies in different industries, if one has reliable 
transaction data (Germain 2007, Setser 2008, Bernanke 2008).  For example, the 
definition of “too big to fail” might be those actors with high centrality measures at the 
intersection of multiple networks as measured by relation type.  A banking relationship 
such as Countrywide Financial Corp. and American International Group Inc. that is at the 
center of both mortgage lending and offering securitized debt as an investment is a case 
in point (This American Life 2008, Center for Public Integrity 2009).  And it could be 
used to test for change over time by looking at the same network at multiple points in 
time (i.e., asking is there a stable group of core actors).  It should be emphasized that the 
use of intersections should be as a test for further study—it is a quick method to see if 
further study is warranted.
Network Strategies Depend on the Framework
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Network analysis is a tool for assessing systemic risk, and regulating accordingly. 
Instead of focusing on the type of actor when developing legislation or other types of 
regulation, regulators should focus on the relationships among them—that is, they should 
use network analysis in crafting their rules and regulations. For example, all the actors in 
finance are connected by each trade or other financial transaction they make; among 
banks, mortgage companies, credit unions, and so on, every transaction is a relationship. 
All of these relationships together make a network.  If we look at a specific type of 
transaction using social network analysis, we should see how financial actors are wired 
together.  
The problem of security and stability in global financial networks is not simply 
one of sheer size, but that some of these actors will be more central than others. There are 
many measures of centrality—some actors will have more interactions, or will have ties 
to more partners, or will closely connect such actors without being as active in trading 
themselves (Wasserman and Faust 1994).  For example, “degree centrality” simply 
measures the number of ties an actor has.  If the relationship is directed, as in the flow of 
money from one actor to another, we can also speak of in-degrees and out-degrees, and in 
the case of money, the relationship is also valued.  Even just using this one measure, we 
can examine the network to see which actors are dealing with each other, how much that 
trade is worth, and in which direction the exchange is flowing.
Network density and flexibility is critically important when context is a deciding 
factor: culture and geography.  High measures of density and low flexibility in terms of 
joining/leaving the network are desirable when enforcement is self-administered and 
where the threat is of long standing, as in the case of nuclear nonproliferation.  In this 
case, allowing states to exit the system of nonproliferation treaties should be discouraged 
as much as possible.  Similarly, nuclear states should be incorporated into the system. 
Slow-moving threats such as this require more consensus and therefore more 
institutionalization, so the aim should be to make the network as dense as possible.  
Density is less important while flexibility is more so when the actors must 
cooperate quickly but not permanently in vastly different regions with different needs, as 
in the case of the tsunami.  If you need to respond to a fast-moving threat, you need both 
a “backbone” of trusted actors that know how to work well together (even if they do not 
work together all the time or even regularly), and the ability to scale up quickly by 
accepting or creating ties to other actors.
Actors in global politics may also occupy different roles within networks such as 
cutpoint and broker, actors that connect otherwise unrelated clusters of individuals. 
Removal of these nodes splits the network into two separate networks that do not interact 
with each other.  The number and the value of these relationships may not look especially 
significant to the network, but these nodes play important parts in passing on the effects 
of shocks such as contagion and bankruptcy.
Toward a Future Research Agenda
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We obviously are at an early stage, and capturing global governance data will be 
problematic until social scientists become more aware of the abundance of data inherent 
in the increasingly digitized records of movements and transactions by actors of every 
stripe.  The possibilities of finding or recording digitized data, and using it to examine 
interaction patterns will grow. Meaningful global governance data is available if we have 
better theory to guide us.  For instance, it would be useful to imagine a laser’s sending a 
sheet of light through a cloud of smoke as it swirls in a current. Many slices will be 
required just to approach a three-dimensional model of the cloud, and we require the 
fourth dimension of time to show air currents. We cannot merely examine one network at 
one point in time—not only do we need lots of slices, but we need to see them in proper 
sequence. We require better pictures, or thick descriptions, of both constituent actors and 
processes.  
Global governance has been a difficult concept to grasp because its manifestations 
sometimes seem inconsistent. Imploding states and the European Union are part of 
contemporary reality, which reflect James Rosenau’s “fragmegration” (Rosenau 1997). 
Keeping in mind simultaneously what seem like inconsistencies is a perceptual problem 
and not an indicator that global governance cannot be understood or made to work better. 
Without adequate depictions of what is going on, policy prescriptions are elusive—hence, 
simultaneous calls for more robust multilateralism as well as for stronger states. If we 
look at sovereignty as an anomaly—or a cancer metastasizing in various directions and 
preventing common solutions—we need tools for diagnosis and prognosis before we can 
apply the correct drugs or surgery. In any case, far more robust and diverse international 
institutions are bound to be part of the mix.
It is ironic that cooperation in extreme security situations such as the tsunami and 
nuclear nonproliferation appears to be much more effective than it is in situations far 
more likely to occur, more likely to affect more people, and more likely to threaten the 
state, such as the cooperation required to assure global financial stability.  Further 
research should investigate the possibility that governing global common pool resources 
such as security is easier at the extremes.
At this time, it is impossible to use global governance theory to predict global 
system change or system-wide conflict, but that does not distinguish it from other bodies 
of theory. To continue the medical analogy, it would be like trying to predict multiple 
organ failure. I suspect that as global governance theory develops and our understanding 
improves, we may be able to use this framework to foresee just these kinds of changes 
within the world system. Slices would show us structural positions, and slices over time 
could show patterns of change. For example, the structure could show which states are 
becoming weaker relative to other actors. Their situations could then be investigated 
more closely to uncover the possible reasons, which could be compared to actors with 
similar structural patterns elsewhere in the system. As one group of analysts writes, 
“Finding local fluidity and global stability…suggests that change moves through 
structurally equivalent actors” (Moody et al. 2005).
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Better information could also be used to calculate probabilities; for instance that a 
structure exhibiting certain characteristics is likely to change in predictable ways. 
Network statistical applications could be particularly useful, especially in modeling the 
cooperation between individual actors in the framework of dynamic or evolutionary game 
theory. Absolute predictability is impossible because all subsequent conditions are 
explained partially by previous ones and partially by chance. In spite of this randomness, 
global governance is about numerous actors’ self-organizing through formal and informal 
means to meet worldwide challenges. 
Conclusion
Many observers attribute a normative aspect to global governance: i.e., it should 
be this, it should achieve that.  I would argue that it is early days yet, and we don’t know 
enough about what is happening to make judgments about the directions in which we 
want to move.  For example, should global institutions be more democratic or more 
efficient?  And how should they be designed—around the relationship or around the type 
of actor?  The purpose of using SNA to model global governance is to create a road map 
so we can decide where we want to go.  
The study of structure, or the paths and processes of interactions, is essential to 
the study of agency, which is why as IR analysts we should move from being slicers of 
cheese to MRI technicians. University of Chicago historian and philosopher of theory 
development William Sewell theorized that dynamic structures are produced, reproduced, 
and transformed by human agency (Sewell 1992).  His approach works equally well in 
history, sociology, and political science.  In this vein, I seek to describe, explain, and 
predict politics at the global level in ways that are comprehensible to others.  Our task 
then is to create a qualitative model of global governance that can identify the most 
important processes by which human beings can exercise their agency, regaining control 
over themselves and the globe’s destiny.  
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